The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings by Sun, Connie
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 1 Issue 3 Article 3 
10-1-1974 
The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings 
Connie Sun 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Connie Sun, “The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings” (1973-1974) 1:3 DLJ 482. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings
Connie Sun*
Introduction
The power of the attorney general to stay criminal proceedings is
rarely discussed in most areas of Canada. However, in British Col-
umbia, and particularly in the city of Vancouver, periodically letters
appear in the local press referring to "subversion of the judicial
process"' and irate judges attack prosecutorial procedures as
"strange - sometimes sinister - manoeuvres". 2 In all cases the
weapon used to effect the alleged injustice is identified as a "stay of
proceedings". Such seemingly defamatory statements might prompt
the uninformed to inquire into the use and alleged abuse of "stays".
This paper, the result of such an inquiry, is offered in the nature
and spirit of a preliminary investigation into the use of the attorney
general's discretionary power to stay proceedings in criminal mat-
ters. The approach is to examine the historical foundation of the
power, its present use, and the basis for recent allegations of abuse.
Much of the study deals with "when" and "by whom" a stay can be
entered. It is postulated that current uses of stays in certain Canadian
jurisdictions constitute misuse of a statutory power because an attor-
ney general cannot legally delegate discretion to implement stays.
Probable illegality also exists in the use of stays before an indictment
has been properly "found". These factors are central to an appar-
ently illicit shift which has occurred in the use of stays in western
Canada. The consideration of the need to stay a criminal charge in
light of exceptional public policy factors has been supplanted by a
consideration of the probable outcome of due process. The necessity
*This paper constitutes a research project undertaken by the writer as part of her third
year LL.B. programme at Dalhousie University. The writer wishes to express her
sincere gratitude to Professor H. N. Janisch of the Faculty of Law for his advice and
supervision. Connie Sun is now with Workers' Compensation Board of British
Columbia in Vancouver.
1. "Lome Parton", Vancouver Province, 12 Oct. 1973, 31.
2. His Honour, Judge A. L. Bewley, Prov. Ct. of B.C., in an unpublished paper
delivered to the Canadian Institute of public Administration in June, 1973.
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to reverse this trend is implicit in the arbitrary nature of the power and
its potential for abuse. It is suggested that the exercise of the power to
stay proceedings be universally restricted to the person of the attorney
general or subjected to such control as would make its abuse unlikely.
I. The Power to Stay Proceedings
Common Law Nolle Prosequi.
At common law one of the broad prerogative powers vested in the
attorney general as chief law enforcement officer of the Crown was
the authority to discontinue proceedings by entering a nolle prosequi
or stay of proceedings. 1 This power is still governed in England by
the common law principles. While the exact origins of the procedure
are uncertain its apparent basis is that the Crown, as the nominal
prosecutor in all criminal matters, should retain the power to stop
proceedings at will.
2
Until the 19th century it was the practice of the attorney general
to hear, applications and argument by one or both parties prior to his
decision whether a nolle should be entered. 3 However, in 1862 R. v.
Allen4 upheld the right of the attorney general to enter a nolle
prosequi without first hearing the parties concerned. The Allen case
outlined the principles governing the attorney general's power and
reiterated that the court has no part to play in a properly directed nolle
prosequi.
The power to enter a stay in England is strictly confined to cases
being heard before a judge and jury on a bill of indictment, and then
only after the indictment has been signed or found. 5 Where the
necessary preconditions are lacking the courts will act to prevent the
minister from exercising his power. In R. v. Wylie, Howe, and
McGuire6 the nolle had been entered during the preliminary hearing.
The court held that since, at that stage, the matter was not properly
before a court, there were no proceedings to be terminated and the fiat
was in every sense a nullity. Despite the fact that instances have
1. See generally J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London, Sweet &
Maxwells, 1964) 226-237.
2. Ibid., at 227.
3. Ibid., at 236.
4. R. v. Allen (1862), 9 Cox C.C. 120 (Q.B.).
5. Edwards, op. cit., at 237.
6. R. v. Wylie, Howe, andMcGuire (1919), 83 J. P. 295 as cited in [1958]Crim. L.
Rev. 537, 575.
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arisen where it would be useful and politically expedient to do so, the
nolle has never been used in summary conviction matters in En-
gland.
7
Historically, entering a nolle prosequi was a very formal proce-
dure in which the attorney general signed and submitted a lengthy
document authorizing the Clerk of the Court to adjourn the pro-
ceedings. 8 It is still the practice in England that the attorney general
personally signs the fiat authorizing the entry of a stay, but the
document itself now takes the following simplified form:
The Queen v. A.B.
Let a Nolle Prosequi be entered in my name in the case of the
above named, whose trial at - on charges
of now stands adjourned, in order to discharge all
further proceedings therein and for so doing this shall be your
warrant.
Her Majesty's Attorney-General. 9
For some time there was considerable doubt whether a nolle
prosequi could be entered at the discretion of prosecuting counsel.i1
However, it was conclusively settled in R. v. Dunn" in 1843 that
only the fiat of the attorney general would suffice to constitute a
proper stay of the proceedings.
The effect of the common law nolle prosequi has been compared
to a discontinuance in a civil action. 12 All proceedings on the indict-
ment are stayed, although the accused may be indicted again on the
same charge. While staying the proceedings does not have the same
effect as offering no evidence and submitting to acquittal, the proce-
dure does put an end to the prosecution on that indictment. The case
of Goddard v. Smith, 13 which apparently has not been overruled in
England, held that the termination of proceedings by the entry of a
nolle prosequi did not operate as an acquittal of the accused so as to
found an action by him for malicious prosecution.14
In an attempt to characterize the circumstances under which the
common law power was exercised, it has been suggested that there
were historically really two quite different situations which justified a
7. "Nina Ponomareva, [1956] Crim. L. Rev. 725.
8. Edwards, op. cit., at 236.
9. Ibid., at 236 and n. 42.
10. Ibid., at 230.
11. R. v. dunn (1843), 1 c. & K. 730.
12. "Nolle Prosequi", [1958] Crim. L. Rev. 573, 574.
13. Goddard v. Smith (1704), 6 Mod. 261; 11 Mod. 56 as cited Ibid., at 573.
14. 1. R. Scott, "Criminal Procedure in Tort: The Effect of 'Nolle Prosequi' on
Actions for Malicious Prosecution" (1973), 2 Anglo-Am. L. R. 288.
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nolleprosequi. 15 First, it was used to dispose of technically imperfect
proceedings instituted by the Crown. Prior to the reforms of the early
1900's, the drafting of indictments was an extremely complicated
process in which it was not uncommon for Crown prosecutors to
commit errors which could not easily be remedied by an amendment
to the indictment. Given modern statutory enactments governing the
drawing and preferring of indictments, the use of nolle prosequi in
this regard is no longer significant. 16 Secondly, a nolle prosequi was
used to prevent the continuance of oppressive but technically proper
proceedings instituted by private prosecutors. Historically the power
was most often identified with this control over private prosecutions.
The unlimited power in the individual to institute proceedings does
not carry with it an unlimited control over them once they are
instituted and where private individuals prosecute alleged offences
there has always been a duty recognized on the part of the Crown to
ensure that the accused was not being persecuted. 17 If the proceed-
ings were frivolous, vexatious, oppressive, or if the Crown for any
reason felt that the accused was not being treated fairly, the remedy
was for the attorney general to stay the proceedings. In England the
use of the nolle prosequi as a control over private prosecutions is now
superfluous as statutory provisions empower the Crown to assume
the prosecution of any criminal proceedings. 18
Current English practice appears to confine the entry of a nolle
prosequi almost entirely to cases where, after the indictment has been
signed, it is found that the accused is unlikely ever to be fit to stand
trial. It is then not possible to place the accused in the charge of the
jury with the object of bringing the proceedings to an end with a
formal verdict of not guilty. 19 There have been a very limited number
of other circumstances over the past decade in England where the
attorney general has exercised his power to stay proceedings. These
infrequent instances reveal no pattern except that the cases are often
of considerable notoriety and the decision to stay proceedings is
usually well publicized in the local press. However, while the press
may have criticized the attorney general's decision to stay proceed-
ings in specific cases, there has apparently been no instance in the
15. Edwards, op. cit., at 234.
16. [1958] Crim. L. Rev. 573, 577; Archbold, (30th ed.) 111.
17. Carter, "Annot" (1967), 50 C.R. 10, 11.
18. [1958] Crim. L. Rev. 573, 578.
19. Ibid.
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present century where the attorney general has been called upon in the
House of Commons to account for his use of the power.
20
Statistics on Use in Canada
In contrast to England, where the use of stays of proceedings has
diminished to insignificance, statistics indicate that the annual inci-
dence of stays in Canada has been, and continues to be increasing.
Particularly alarming are the figures for the provinces of Manitoba
and British Columbia, which have maintained an inordinately high
incidence of stays whether considered numerically or as percentages
of charges laid.
During the period 1966-1970 the average number of stays used
per year in every province except British Columbia and Manitoba
was less than 5.5 per 1000 charges. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec averaged less than one stay
per 1000 charges. During the same period, British Columbia aver-
aged 75.4 and Manitoba averaged 64.9 stays per 1000 charges.
While there are some difficulties inherent in analyzing the
statistics of past decades, it seems fairly safe to state that the
wholesale use of stays in British Columbia and Manitoba is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, occurring over the last 25 years. 21 The
identifiable upward trend in British Columbia became apparent
around 1950. In that year, out of 98 stays entered across Canada,
British Columbia accounted for 23.22 This was in contrast to the
period 1946 to 1949 during which Canada had averaged 76 stays and
British Columbia 3.5 per annum.23 By 1953, out of 533 stayed
charges in Canada, 327 were in British Columbia.2 4
While the use of stays in British Columbia during the period
1966-1970 has been fairly consistent each year, Manitoba has in-
creased, with 1970 accounting for 842 stays out of 8334 charges, or
101.2 per 1000 charges. These figures all relate to indictable offence
charges.
20. Ibid., at 579-582. Examples cited of recent use of nolle prosequi are unreported
cases: the dock strike, 1951; the Merrifield case, 1953; and, the Adams' case, 1957.
21. The difficulties with the statistics arise from section 904 in the 1927 Code which
provided fornolleprosequi in Ontario but was dropped in the 1953-54 revision. Also
the periods covered by the reports varied.
22. D.B.S., 75th Annual Report, Stats. of Crim. and other offences, 85 and 102.
23. D.B.S., 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th Annual Reports, Stats. of Crim. and other
offences, passim.
24. D.B.S., 78th Annual Report, Stats. of Crim. and other offences, 73 and 83.
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Prosecutions under federal statutes are included in these figures.
However, since the 1967 Criminal Code amendment, expanding the
definition of "attorney general", offences under federal statutes
other than the Criminal Code have been prosecuted primarily by
representatives of the Federal Justice Department.2 5 The use of stays
by federal prosecutors follows the previously described pattern with
respect to frequency in British Columbia and Manitoba. For exam-
ple, in 1970, out of 171 stays entered across Canada in prosecutions
under federal statutes, 111 were in British Columbia and 54 in
Manitoba.26
Criteria for Use
The phenomenal disparity in the frequency of stays across Canada
indicates vastly different standards for utilization. Inquiries made of
the provinces infrequently using stays indicate some consistency in
the circumstances justifying their use. The most common criteria
stated were:
27
(1) when, in the case of a misdemeanor, a civil action is pending for
the same cause; 28 (2) when there has been an attempt to oppress the
defendants as by repeatedly preferring defective indictments for the
same offence;29 (3) when the accused is unable to stand trial or it is
undesirable that he do so due to some mental infirmity;30 (4) when a
similar case is on appeal to a higher court; 31 (5) when a witness is
missing or has been intimidated; 32 (6) when there is insufficient
evidence but a good possibility of new evidence coming to light
within a short period. 33 Provinces infrequently using stays were
unanimous in describing it as an extraordinary power rarely required.
25. See letters to Connie Sun from Federal Dept. of Justice Regional Directors:
Vancouver, 18 Oct. 1973; Winnipeg, 19 Oct. 1973.
26. Stats. Can., Stats. of Crim. and other offences, 1970, Table 11 (unpublished).
27. Inquiries concerning the criteria applied in the use of stays were sent to the 10
provincial attorneys general and a number of prosecutors across Canada chosen at
random. For list of replies received see Bibliography.
28. Letter from Nfld. Dept. of Justice to Connie Sun, 28 Aug. 1973.
29. Ibid.
30. Letter from Ont. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 5 Sept. 1973.
31. Letter from N.B. Dept. of Justice to Connie Sun, 5 Sept. 1973.
32. Ibid.
33. Letter from Agent of the Att'y. Gen. Saskatoon, Sask. to Connie Sun, 2 Oct.
1973.
The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings 489
The distinguishing feature of the responses from British Colum-
bia and Manitoba was their inclusion of two additional criteria: 34 (1)
that they would stay charges where there was insufficient evidence
but not necessarily any likelihood of a change in circumstances so as
to allow for recommencement of proceedings, and (2) that they
would use stays in "plea bargaining" situations.
The director of the Federal Justice Department's Winnipeg
office stated - "In Manitoba we do not follow the practice of
withdrawing charges when for one reason or another the Crown
decides not to proceed. We customarily use a stay. This situation can
occur in a number of ways; for example: (1) cases where a number of
charges are preferred against an accused and the Crown decides to
proceed with the major charge or the accused pleads guilty to a major
charge, the balance of the counts are disposed of by way of a stay of
proceedings. (2) where there are three or four co-accused and a plea is
entered by one and it is the Crown's intention not to proceed against
the others, then a stay of proceedings is used." 35 The Manitoba
attorney general's office added the criterion that a stay would be
entered where the "right" person was charged but there was insuffi-
cient evidence to make out a case for the prosecution.
3 6
Consideration of the use of stays in British Columbia should be
prefaced by noting that the prosecutorial system in that province is an
exception to the usual Canadian practice of provincially employed
Crown prosecutors. Organized municipalities in British Columbia
are responsible for their own administration of justice. Lower courts
prosecutors are employed by the municipalities; full time in the larger
areas and part time in smaller centres. In unorganized territory,
prosecutors are appointed by the provincial attorney general on an ad
hoc basis, as they are for all trials in the superior courts of criminal
jurisdiction. 3 7 With that structure in mind it is perhaps easier to
appreciate the contradictory state of affairs existing in British Col-
umbia with regard to stays.
34. Letters to Connie Sun from Man. Att'y. Gen's. Dept., 30 Aug. 1973; A. S.
McMorran, Vancouver City Prosecutor, 12 Sept. 1973; B. C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept.,
23 Oct. 1973.
35. Letter from Fed. Dept. of Justice, Regional Director, Winnipeg, to Connie Sun,
19 Oct. 1973.
36. Letter from Man. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 30 Aug. 1973.
37. B. Grosman, The Prosecutor (University of Toronto Press, 1969) 19 and n.32;
While this paper was being written the announcement was made that B.C. intends to
institute a provincially operated crown counsel system in 1974.
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The Senior Prosecutor for the city of Victoria cited the following
instances when a stay would probably be entered: 38 (1) when there
has been a significant procedural error; (2) when presently available
evidence appears insufficient; (3) when a material witness is unavail-
able; (4) where an abuse of process or lack of merit is indicated; (5)
where the complainant on an information is unwilling, in proper
circumstances, to terminate proceedings. As to instances (1) to (3), a
good possibility of re-institution or renewal of the prosecution must
be present.
3 9
The approach in Vancouver is considerably different and, al-
though there are no official statistics available to support the proposi-
tion, it is apparent from the press and other sources that a dispropor-
tionate number of the stays entered in British Columbia are in
Vancouver's lower courts. 40 The determining factor as to whether a
withdrawal or stay will be used, according to Vancouver city pro-
secutor A. Stewart McMorran, is whether the accused has been
"properly charged".41 If the staff prosecutor unilaterally decides
that the charge was proper a stay will be used rather than withdrawing
the charge. McMorran stated his policy in these terms - "Generally
speaking if witnesses are not available and for this or any other reason
an adjournment cannot or should not be obtained, or an adjournment
is refused, the Prosecutor should control the proceedings by entering
a stay, not allow the charge to be read where the only result must be a
dismissal. There should be no dismissals for want of prosecution.
This is a reflection often undeserved on the administration of justice,
in my opinion. ' 42 According to Mr. McMorran charges are re-laid
"very, very rarely". 43 Another criterion cited by Mr. McMorran,
38. Letter from J. W. Anderson, Senior Prosecutor, City of Victoria, to Connie Sun,
11 Sept. 1973.
39. Ibid.
40. The province of B.C. apparently maintains no statistics on judicial activity
within the province. See letter from B.C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 3 Dec.
1973. Officials of the Provincial Courts in Vancouver have their own statistical
reports which indicate that stays entered in all types of offences (i.e. Crim. Code,
Fed. statutes, Prov. statutes, Municipal by-laws) in Vancouver's Provincial Courts
totalled 1,768 in 1971, and 3,583 to the end of Nov. 1973. The statistics for 1972 are
incomplete due to a strike of court officials in that year. However, the figure for 1972
has been cited as "over 2,100". See His Honour, Judge A. L. Bewley, Prov. Ct. of
B.C., "Paper delivered to Canadian Institute of Public Administration", June 1973
(unpublished).
41. Appendix A, 1.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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and common also to Manitoba, is to use a stay where two or more
charges are laid against an accused and a plea of guilty is entered on
one.44
This discussion of the use of stays in British Columbia has been
concerned with provincially authorized exercise of the power. The
federal regional director in Vancouver offers no explanation for the
frequency of the use of stays by his office other than the fact that
federal prosecutors utilize the established practice in British Colum-
bia of entering stays rather than trying to withdraw charges or allow-
ing dismissals when there is insufficient evidence to support a convic-
tion.
45
II. The Statutory Basis
The power to stay proceedings in Canada is in Criminal Code sections
508 and 732.1, which pertain to indictable and summary offence
proceedings respectively. 1
508.(1) The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for
the purpose may, at any time after an indictment has been found
and before judgment, direct the clerk of the court to make an
entry on the record that the proceedings are stayed by his
direction, and when the entry is made all proceedings on the
indictment shall be stayed accordingly and any recognizance
relating to the proceedings is vacated. 1953-54, c.51, s.490.
(2) Proceedings stayed in accordance with subsection (1)
may be recommenced, without laying a new charge or prefer-
ring a new indictment, as the case may be, by the Attorney
General or counsel instructed by him for the purpose giving
notice of the recommencement to the clerk of the court in which
the stay of proceedings was entered, but where no such notice is
given within one year after the entry of the stay of proceedings,
the proceedings shall be deemed never to have been com-
menced. 1972, c.13, s.43(l).
732.1 (1) The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for
the purpose may, at any time after proceedings are commenced
and before judgment, direct the clerk of the court to make an
entry on the record that the proceedings are stayed by his
44. Ibid., at 2.
45. Letter from Fed. Dept. of Justice, Regional Director, Vancouver, to Connie
Sun, 18 Oct. 1973.
Part II
1. R.S.C. 1970, c.c.-34, ss. 508,732.1. The codified version of the stay was s. 732
in the 1892 Code, s. 962 in the 1906 and 1927 Codes, and s. 490 in the 1953-54
Code.
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direction and when the entry is made the proceedings shall be
stayed accordingly and any recognizance relating to the pro-
ceedings is vacated.
(2) Proceedings stayed in accordance with subsection (1)
may be recommenced, without laying a new information, by the
Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for the purpose
giving notice of the recommencement to the clerk of the court in
which the stay of proceedings was entered, but where no such
notice is given within one year after the entry of the stay of
proceedings or before the expiration of the time within which
the proceedings could have been instituted, whichever is the
earlier, the proceedings shall be deemed never to have been
commenced. 1972, c. 13, s.62.
... Before Judgment"
The power to direct a stay remains until the time judgment is entered.
In the case of R. v. Beaudry2 the crown prosecutor entered a stay of
proceedings after the accused had testified in his own defense while
being tried for murder and the presiding judge had directed the jury to
return an acquittal. Notwithstanding the stay, the judge received the
verdict and discharged the accused who was immediately arrested
and charged with assault causing bodily harm of the alleged murder
victim.
While the Beaudry case appears to contravene all accepted
notions of double jeopardy it was argued that the accused was
charged in the second indictment with an offence different from that
covered by the indictment for murder, and that a verdict of acquittal
on the murder charge would not have supported a plea of autrefois
acquit on the assault charge. 3 This rationale avoids the main point in
issue; if the alleged offences were unrelated, why was it necessary or
proper to override the judge in the murder trial and deny the accused
an acquittal he had earned on the merits of the case?
The pointed comment by Bull, J. A. of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, that the procedure adopted by the Crown was
"somewhat odd, and perhaps harsh", appears well-founded. 4 In
addition to its procedural implications, the Beaudry case is instruc-
tive of the type of abuse possible if the power to stay proceedings is
not regulated, since it is an exception to the general rule that an
accused has the "right to be called upon once and only once to stand
2. R. v. Beaudry, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 272; 50 C.R. I (B.C.C.A.).
3. Carter, op. cit., at 14.
4. [1967] 1 C.C.C. 272 (B.C.C.A.), 274.
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in peril on an accusation in respect of the same matter and the same
offence.' '1
Effect of the Stay
The Canadian law on the recommencement of stayed proceedings
was in the past somewhat disputed. In R. v. Takagishi, 6 the British
Columbia Supreme Court held that a new charge was required in
order to recommence stayed proceedings. However, in 1962 the
Alberta Supreme Court in R. ex. rel Graham v. Leonard, 7 disting-
uishing between the effect of withdrawing a charge and staying
proceedings, stated per Kirby, J. - "When a charge has been
withdrawn, there is no charge on the record, and in order to continue
the prosecution a new charge would have to be laid. Withdrawing a
charge has the effect of ending the proceedings. When a stay has been
entered however the crown can at any further time continue the
proceedings without laying any charge.'" The procedural question in
these and other conflicting cases was resolved by the enactment of
Code Section 508(2) in 1972, 9 which dispensed with the need for a
new charge.
History of Section 732.1
Added to the Code in 1972 section 732.1 created, for the first time in
Canada, the power to stay summary conviction proceedings.10 For
years prior to this amendment, however, prosecutors in British Col-
umbia routinely used stays in summary conviction matters, appar-
ently without objection from either magistrates or defence counsel. In
a 1968 memorandum to his staff, Vancouver city prosecutor McMor-
ran justified the use of stays in summary offence proceedings by
5. P. E. Greenfield, "The Position of the Stay in Magistrate's Court" (1962), 4
Crim. L. Q. 373, 374.
6. R. v. Takagishi (1932), 60 C.C.C. 34 (B.C.S.C.).
7. Re: Crown Practice Rules, R. ex rel Graham v. Leonard (1962), 38 W.W.R. 300
(Alta. S.C.), aff'd. by, 39 W.W.R. 343 (Alta. C.A.).
8. Ibid., at 303.
9. Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 43 (Bill C-2). In 1971
Andrew Brewin (NDP-Greenwood) had introduced Bill C-266 to provide for dismis-
sal of charges one year after stay of proceedings directed but it completed first
reading only. See Debates, House of Commons, (1971) Vol. VIII, 7862.
10. Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 62; Apparently no statistics
are available on the use of stays in summary conviction matters prior to the amend-
ment. The author's informal discussions with judges in N.S. indicate that they were
never used in that province, and that a strong common law tradition would prevent
their use in summary conviction matters.
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reasoning that, "... if the attorney general can stop a serious charge
he must be entitled to stop a minor one.. .
A 1969 decision in Burnaby, British Columbia, by Provincial
Court Judge D. M. McNeil, held that a stay could not be used in
summary offence proceedings while simultaneously confirming that
countless numbers of such absolutely null and void stays had been
entered in British Columbia courts.
12
The case involved a number of students who were individually
charged with a summary offence following occupation of some
Simon Fraser University buildings. Those proceedings were stayed
to facilitate a joint charge that was dismissed because it issued after
the six month limitation period. The Crown then reverted to proceed-
ing with the stayed charges on the strenuously opposed basis that,
since summary offence proceedings could not be legally stayed, the
previously directed stays were void and the original charges stood.
That contention was upheld in a reserved decision after exhaustive
legal argument, but, in the face of an expressed intention on the part
of the defendants to appeal, the Crown withdrew the charges and
avoided a binding appellate court decision on the issue.
That judgment on a longstanding illegal practice in British
Columbia was seemingly overlooked by authoritative law reports,
but it apparently prompted Vancouver prosecutor McMorran to in-
itiate a recommendation to the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation which led to the 1972 code amendment
regarding summary conviction stays.'
3
The proceedings in the House of Commons and the Committee
on Justice and Legal Affairs reveal no explanation as to why the
extension of the power was believed to be necessary, or why the
majority of provinces did not question the amendment, as they
seldom used stays in indictable offence matters and presumably had
never sought to use them in summary conviction matters. At common
law the power to stay proceedings has never been deemed necessary
at the summary conviction level.14 In as much as the power is an
extraordinary one, allowing suppression of the judicial process only
to prevent grave injustice, by definition there must exist potential for
11. Appendix A, 2.
12. R. v. Ronald Dickson, Burnaby, B.C., 3 Oct. 1969, before Prov. Judge D. M.
McNeil (unreported), cited in "Case Notes" (1969), 27 Advocate 285.
13. Letter from D. H. Christie to Connie Su, 8 Nov. 1973.
14. Edwards, op. cit., at 236.
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serious consequences in the prosecution. Presumably, it is assumed
in England that summary conviction offences are of a type that the
disposition and consequences could not justify such intervention.
Prior to the amendment the standard Canadian practice (except
perhaps in British Columbia) was to apply to the court to withdraw
the charge where valid reasons prevailed for doing so. 15 The applica-
tion could be refused for cause (and presumably appealed) but a
withdrawal would not restrict the right of the Crown to lay a new
information. In R. v. Somersi6 Martin, J. A., delivering the judge-
ment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, cited with approval
the following passage in R. v. Tyrone JJ.17
In my opinion, the permission given by the Justices to withdraw
the first complaint did not amount to an acquittal. The order
involved no more than the consent of the Justices that the
question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the sum-
mons should be withdrawn from their cognizance, that is, that
they should not adjudicate upon it. There was, therefore, an
absence of adjudication; whilst, to amount to an acquittal, it was
necessary that there should be an adjudication on the merits. The
withdrawal had not, in my opinion any greater effect than that
which a nolle prosequi has in proceedings by indictment, and
that undoubtedly, would not be an answer to a subsequent
indictment for the same offence. '8
After an Indictment has been Found"
Section 508 explicitly stipulates when a stay may be entered, i.e. "at
any time after an indictment has been found and before judgement."
In non-Grand Jury provinces, the power to enter a stay has been held
to arise after a formal charge has been preferred in lieu of an indict-
ment. 19
Substantial impetus to western Canadian practices in staying
indictable offence proceedings has come from the Alberta Appeal
Court opinion in R. ex rel Graham v. Leonard. 2 0 In that case the
Crown had declined to prosecute and later intervened in a private
prosecution for the purpose of withdrawing the indictable offence
charge while it was still before a magistrate. In the Appeal Court's
opinion the Crown should have stayed the proceedings rather than
15. Letter from D. H. Christie to Connie Sun, 8 Nov. 1973.
16. R. v. Somers (1929), 51 C.C.C. 356 (B.C.C.A.).
17. R. v. Tyrone JJ., (1912) 2 I.R. 44 (Irish K. B.).
18. Ibid., at 48 per Palles C.B.
19. R. v. Edwards (1919), 31 C.C.C. 330 (Alta. S.C.).
20. (1962), 39 W.W.R. 343 (Alta. C.A.).
496 The Dalhousie Law Journal
apply to withdraw the charges, but it was held that in either event the
appellant had no absolute right to prosecute privately. In what ap-
pears to be obiter dicta, that court rationalized its divergent views
with the obiter expressed by the learned judge appealed from and
asserted that section 490(now 508) must be read as if the word
"information" was substituted therein for the word "indictment".
This finding was based on the Code definition of "indictment", i.e.
indictment includes (a) information, presentment, and a count
therein; (b) a plea, replication, or other proceeding, and (c) any
record.21
That judicial opinion manifestly ignores the definitive charac-
teristics of an indictment found in the Code sections under Procedure
by Indictment, and if it is valid it follows that as soon as a Justice of
the Peace accepts an "information" from anyone, the accused is
upon indictment for the purpose of applying section 508.22 However,
section 508 further specifies that an indictment must be "found" and
code section 503 states that finding an indictment includes (a) prefer-
ring an indictment, and, (b) presentment of an indictment by a grand
jury.23 The appellate court in R. ex rel Graham v. Leonard appar-
ently neglected to address itself to the meaning or effect of the word
"found".
Code section 732.1 empowers the attorney general to stay sum-
mary conviction proceedings "at any time after proceedings are
commenced and before judgment. .. " Comparing those qualifying
words to the Section 508 phrase "- . .. at any time after an
indictment has been found and before judgment. . ." - emphasizes
that finding an indictment is materially different from merely com-
mencing proceedings with respect to an indictable offence.
There is surely no law or statutory procedure that even remotely
suggests a valid indictment could be "found", or that it is legal to
"direct the clerk of the court to make an entry on the record that the
proceedings are stayed", if prosecutors follow McMorran's directive
of not allowing "the charge to be read" in open court as is frequently
done when staying proceedings in Vancouver.
24
K. C. Davis, in his book Discretionary Justice observed that
legislative bodies are most notably deficient in specifying the limits
21. R.S.C. 1970, c.c.-34, s.2.
22. Greenfield, op. cit., at 378.
23. R.S.C. 1970, c.c.-34, s. 503.
24. Appendix A, 1.
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on delegated power by their failure to correct the administrative
assumption of discretionary power which is illegal or of doubtful
legality. 25 Such an assumption of illegal power appears to be the
result of the unchallenged interpretation of the phrase "at any time
after an indictment has been found". It is probable that the correct
interpretation of this phrase is that a stay is legally possible only after
an indictment has been preferred by the Crown, i.e. after a committal
for trial following a preliminary hearing, a presentment by a Grand
Jury, or a direct indictment preferred by the attorney general. 26 The
common law position, as set out by Dr. John Edwards, is very clear
on this point - "The entry of a nolle prosequi by the principal law
officer of the crown, it is once more emphasized, is strictly confined
to cases which are heard before a judge and jury on a bill of indict-
ment, and then only after the indictment has been signed or found.' '27
MacLean, J., of the British Columbia Supreme Court, noted in
Re O'Brien that counsel for the applicant argued "with some consid-
erable force" that a stay could only be entered "at a Supreme Court
trial with a jury." ' 28 He did not, however, find it necessary to
determine the matter.
The Alberta judicial opinion which equates "information" with
"indictment", as the term is used in section 508, is by no means
conclusive. The result may be that stays of proceedings in indictable
matters are quite improper in provincial courts or magistrate's courts.
Allowing proceedings to be stayed only after they are duly before a
federally appointed judge on an indictment probably reveals an
intention by Parliament to inhibit provincial attorneys general from
possibly abusing the power by assuming the supervision of high court
judges.2
9
It is interesting to consider the circuitious debate in the Justice
and Legal Affairs Committee concerning the amendment extending
the power to stay proceedings in summary conviction matters. It was
contended by Andrew Brewin (NDP-Greenwood) that the power
25. K. C. Davis,Discretionary Justice (Louisiana State University Press, 1969) 55.
26. Letter from Judge A. L. Bewley to Connie Sun, 17 Oct. 1973.
27. Edwards, op. cit., at 236-237.
28. Re: Magistrates Protection Act, Re: O'Brien (1961-62), 36 W.W.R. 511
(B.C.S.C.), 512.
29. Until the 1967 amendment extending the Criminal Code definition of attorney
general all prosecutions were under the authority of provincial attorneys-general.
The validity of that amendment is, of course, still the subject of argument. See Re
Collins and The Queen (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 40 (Ont. H.C.) which held the
amendment intra vires. To date Collins has apparently not been appealed.
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should not be extended to summary offences because, as a possible
instrument of abuse or oppression, it should only be exercised before
superior courts "which presumably are at a higher level of judicial
sensitivity". D. H. Christie, Associate Deputy Minister of Justice,
replied that since 95% of indictable offences are dealt with in
magistrate's court, to be consistent one would also have to argue that
the power should not apply in indictable offence proceedings. 30
While Mr. Christie's argument would not seem particularly relevant
to the issue of whether it was necessary to extend the power to
summary offence proceedings, it is even more misleading if you
consider that it may be an illicit assumption of power to enter stays in
magistrate's court.
.. Counsel Instructed by Him for the Purpose"
The power to stay proceedings is vested in "the attorney general or
counsel instructed by him for the purpose". Section 2 of the Criminal
Code defines attorney general as the provincial attorney general or
solicitor-general in prosecutions under the Criminal Code; the attor-
ney general of Canada in proceedings either in the Territories or "by
or on behalf of" the federal government under federal statutes other
than the Criminal Code; and, their lawful deputies. 31
There is a wide and irreconcilable difference between eastern
and western provinces as to what is meant by "counsel instructed by
him for the purpose". The provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island
appear to be adhering to common law precepts and recognized
principles of statute interpretation in entering stays only on the direct
authority of the attorney general, or when counsel has been specifi-
cally instructed by him with regards to the facts of a particular case.32
The four western provinces, however, have interpreted the
phrase differently. In Alberta, the local Crown prosecutor, as agent
of the attorney general, sends a recommendation to the Director of
Criminal Justice who reviews the application and provides the neces-
sary authorization. 33 Saskatchewan treats the authority to enter stays
30. Proceedings, Justice and Legal Affairs Committee, 11-5-1972, 7:35.
31. R.S.C. 1970, c.c.-34, S. 2.
32. Letters to Connie Sun from Ont. Att'y. Gen's. Dept., 5 Sept. 1973; Que. Dept.
of Justice, 11 Oct. 1973; N.B. Dept. of Justice, 5 Sept. 1973; N.S. Att'y. Gen's.
Dept., 26 Oct. 1973; Nfld. Dept. of Justice, 28 Aug. 1973; P.E. Dept. of Justice, 5
Sept. 1973.
33. Letter from Alta. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 24 Sept. 1973.
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as implicit in the appointment of Crown prosecutors. The decision of
when to stay proceedings is made by the Crown prosecutor who
would consult with the Director of Public Prosecutions only where
some precedent might be created by the use of a stay in the particular
circumstances of a given case.34 Manitoba interprets the section as
permitting general delegation of the discretion and every Crown
Attorney is so empowered at all times.
3 5
British Columbia delegates, to all prosecutors appointed on an
ad hoc basis and all municipal prosecutors, a general authority to stay
proceedings in summary conviction and minor indictable offences.
Should the matter be of a "serious nature", the prosecutors are
instructed "to be in touch with the Department directly". 36 In prac-
tice in Victoria city prosecutor refers all stays to the minister for
approval3 7 although the attorney general's department describes this
as being done "out of an abundance of caution" on the prosecutor's
part.3 8 This contrasts sharply with the Vancouver city prosecutor
who described his authority in the following terms -' "As City
Prosecutor of Vancouver I have the authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral, if needed, to enter stays of proceedings before, during, or after
court on any charges in which I consider it proper to do so and I am
authorized to delegate this authority to the Prosecutors for whom I am
responsible, and have done so.' '39 Mr. McMorran also offered the
suggestion that he may not need categorical authorization to enter
stays from the attorney general because the city is responsible for the
administration of justice under the Vancouver Incorporation Act or,
alternatively, by virtue of his appointment as agent for the attorney
general for all purposes under the Code. 40
In neither Manitoba nor British Columbia do the prosecutors
produce any written authority when entering a stay.41 The procedure
34. Letter from Agent of the Att'y. Gen., Saskatoon, Sask. to Connie Sun, 2 Oct.
1973.
35. Letter from Man. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 30 Aug. 1973.
36. Letter from B.C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 23 Oct. 1973.
37. Letter from J. W. Anderson, Senior Prosecutor, City of Vancouver, to Connie
Sun, 11 Sept. 1973.
38. Letter from B. C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 23 Oct. 1973.
39. Appendix B, 1.
40. Letter from A. S. McMorran, Vancouver City Prosecutor, to Connie Sun, 12
Sept. 1973.
41. Letters to Connie Sun from Judge H. F. F. Gyles, 9 Oct. 1973: Judge I. V.
Dubienski, undated; Judge M. Baryluk, undated; Judge W. M. Darichuk, 9 Oct.
1973; Judge A. L. Bewley, 17 Oct. 1973; Judge D. Moffett, 4 Oct. 1973.
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is accomplished simply by a verbal instruction to the clerk of the
court. In contrast, an attorney general in Ontario personally signifies
his decision to stay proceedings in writing.
4 2
Identical qualifying words are used in the present Code sections
508 and 732.1 as were used in section 490 of the 1955 Code. The
organization of the replaced section 962 of the 1927 Code may be of
some assistance in interpreting the present sections.-
S.962 - The Attorney-General may, at any time after an
indictment has been found against any person for any offence
and before judgement is given thereon, direct the officer of the
court to make on the record an entry that the proceedings are
stayed by his direction, and on such an entry being made all such
proceedings shall be stayed accordingly.
2. The Attorney-General may delegate such power in any
particular court to any counsel nominated by him.
43
It is submitted that the words "may delegate such power" in former
section 962(2) and "instructed by him for the purpose" in present
sections 508 and 732.1 refer to the power to "direct" a stay in
particular proceedings and not to a general or specific power to decide
whether or not there is to be a stay.
The basic principle which speaks against allowing the attorney
general to delegate his power is expressed in the maximum
"delegatus non potest delegare". The power to stay proceedings is
delegated to the attorney general as part of his function as chief law
enforcement officer of the Crown and it is not open to him to
sub-delegate.
Parliament, naturally, may authorize sub-delegation and where
that express power is found in the legislation no question will arise,
except perhaps as to its scope. 44 Sections 508 and 732. 1, however,
cannot be taken as authorizing sub-delegation in view of the use of the
word "instructed". Instruction has a common law definition of
"order given by a principal to his agent in relation to the business of
his agency." ' 45 Since "instructed" was used in preference to the
42. Letter from Prof. J. D. Morton to Prof. J. Ortego, 25 Oct. 1973; Letter from J.
Cassells, Crown Attorney, Ottawa-Carleton, to Connie Sun, 13 Nov. 1973. The
author's informal discussions with judges and prosecutors confirmed that this is also
the practice in N.S.
43. Tremeear, Annotated Criminal code of Canada (5th. ed., Calgary, Burroughs,
1944) 1220.
44. M.N.R. v. Wright's Canadian Ropes Ltd., [1947]1 D.L.R. 721,728 cited by R.
Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto, Butterworths, 1971) 271 and n.
102.
45. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed., 1968) 941.
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more general terms such as "authorized", "delegated", etc., it
appears fairly clear that Parliament intended something in the nature
of an agency relationship between the attorney general and his coun-
sel. Agency implies a close and continuing alliance wherein the agent
is well informed of the principal's policy and intentions, i.e. it
presupposes the existence of established criteria and constant com-
munication, if not specific authorization in each and every case.
4 6
Certainly in neither British Columbia nor Manitoba can the attorney
general claim such a relationship with the prosecutors who are, in
fact, deciding when proceedings will be stayed. To suggest that
counsel has been "instructed" under such circumstances is patently
false.
4 7
Robert Reid in Administrative Law and Practice states - "The
view has been propounded with increasing frequency by Canadian
courts that, in the absence of express statutory authority a quasi-
judicial or discretionary power - the terms are usually used
synonomously in this context - may not be sub-delegated." '4 8
However, the distinction between powers that are sub-delegable and
those that are not has not always been expressed in terms of an
"administrative-judicial" dichotomy and attempted sub-delegation
of powers has been refused for lack of authority without their charac-
terization as quasi-judicial. 49 In any event, the power to stay proceed-
ings is recognized at least by some provincial departments of the
attorney-general to be quasi-judicial and such a classification would
seem indisputable given its broad capacity to affect rights.
50
It is recognized, of course, that in modern government a great
number of decisions, the responsibility for which is committed to a
minister, are in fact taken by civil servants in the minister's name
without reference to him personally. 51 There is, however, an impor-
tant exception to this trend where - "the class of decision is so
46. See generally H. Fridman, Agency (3rd. ed., London, Butterworths, 1971).
47. But see Letter from Judge D. Moffett to Connie Sun, 4 Oct. 1973, which
describes the "instruction" as a "legal fiction". Mr. McMorran does not subscribe
to this view but accepts his authority as a valid "blanket" delegation of power.
48. Reid, op. cit., at 272 and see n. 106.
49. Ibid., at 272-273.
50. Letter from Man. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 30 Aug. 1973. For criteria
in classifying power as quasi-judicial see generally R. v. Institutional Head of
Beaver Creek Correctional Camp, e.p. MacCaude (1967), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 545 (Ont.
C.A.); L'Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montreal v. La Commission des
Relations Ouvrieres et al. (1953), 4 D.L.R. 161 (S.C.C.).
51. S.A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administration Law (London, Penguin
Books, 1971) 189.
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important that nothing less then the Minister's personal attention is
appropriate (for example, because the decision concerns the liberty of
the subject . ..)"52 In England the power to stay proceedings has
always been recognized as falling within this category and hence
requiring the personal exercise of the minister's discretion. 53
Not only is the delegation of the discretion to stay proceedings
without discernible legality but it is inherently dangerous and con-
trary to public policy. It is'well established that the executive power
should be separate from the judicial process. 54 As an extraordinary
exception to the general rule, the power to stay proceedings is a
procedure whereby a specific politically responsible law officer can
suppress the judicial process and override the independence of the
judiciary. In principle it is assumed that this extraordinary power will
be used sparingly and with circumspection by the attorney general
personally, as he is in no way answerable to the courts in the matter of
a properly founded stay and is only theoretically answerable to a
legislature for any misuse.
55
A large measure of the concern expressed over the 1970 im-
plementation of the War Measures Act 56 was that it allowed the
executive to unduly usurp judicial functions without the ordinary
safeguards of due process under the Criminal Code. For example,
one complaint frequently heard was that the Identification of Crimi-
nals Act57 was effectively suspended in as much as many detained but
uncharged persons were finger-printed and photographed. It was
commonly appreciated in Quebec that many persons were taken into
custody simply for the purposes of subjecting them to those identifi-
cation procedures. Less conspicuous short term incarcerations and
circumvention of the Identification of Criminals Act are facilitated by
stays when police and prosecutors work in close alliance or operate
under the same administrative body as in Vancouver.
It has been well established that a substantial gap exists between
legal theory and prosecutorial practice, even without the license to
local prosecutors to use stays on their own initiative. In fact, pub-
lished studies suggest that prosecutorial values and processes resem-
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., at 173.
54. See generally Act of Settlement 1701; de Smith, Constitutional andAdministra-
tion Law 356-376.
55. deSmith, Constitutional andAdministrative Law 379; Edwards, op. cit., at 231.
56. War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2.
57. Identification of Criminals Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-1.
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ble administrative and managerial values more than they do adver-
sary and judicia goals.5 8 For example, Mr. McMorran instructed his
prosecutors that "there should be no dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion" in that this "is a reflection often undeserved on the administra-
tion of justice." ' 59 Surely it is undesirable and unnecessary to so
assiduously foster the belief that the police never err in laying
charges.
The potential for abuse in delegating discretion to use stays to
local prosecutors is simply phenomenal and militates against the
legitimacy of some attorneys general attempting to interpret the Code
so as to authorize such a delegation. 60
IL. Controlling the Discretionary Power
to Stay Proceedings
Rationale for the Frequent Use of Stays
The British Columbia attorney general's department sanctions the
use of stays in circumstances that would generally warrant the with-
drawal of the charge. The department's reason for favoring a stay is
their assertion that judges in British Columbia will, more frequently
than their colleagues in other provinces, exercise their discretion to
refuse an application to withdraw charges. "Rather than have a
lengthy argument with respect to the merits of the charge", a stay is
58. See generally B. Grosman, Prosecuting Practices and the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Canada. (1967, Cdn. theses on microfilm, No. 2129).
59. Appendix A, 1; But consider the following observation on the theory of pro-
secutorial discretion in England:
The police in England cannot withdraw a prosecution, once it has been started,
without leave of the court . . ., or intervention by the Attorney-General; in
America mere local prosecutors can enter a nolle prosequi without control or
supervision. "G. Williams, "Discretion in Prosecuting", [1956] Crim. L. Rev.
222, 226-227.
60. The potential for undisclosed abuse of criminal processes by police is enhanced
by the fact that stayed proceedings on the basis of section 508 (2) are probably sub
judice with all the implications that has for inhibiting public comment.
In view of the many allegations of police misconduct during the Vancouver Gastown
Riots it seems highly probable that the staying by local prosecutors of several
criminal proceedings initiated both by police and by citizens against police effec-
tively suppressed public knowledge that would have ordinarily been disclosed
through direct testimony and cross-examination. Stays were apparently used fre-
quently with regard to both the "Gastown" and "English Bay Riots". E.g. "3
Gastown cases dropped", Vancouver Province, 23 Dec. 1971, 2; "Charge drop-
ped", Vancouver Sun, 24 Dec. 1971, 3; "Riot charged dropped", Vancouver Sun,
21 Oct. 1971, 78.
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entered which as an exercise of executive power is entirely outside
the ambit of the courts' authority. 1
The British Columbia position is based on the assumption that
"from a practical point of view there is really no distinction between
a stay and a withdrawal." 2 The fundamental fallacy in this approach
was succinctly expressed by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Klopfer v. North Carolina3 where it was held that, despite the
fact that the accused was at liberty, the nolle prosequi in that case
violated the petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial. 4 In the
words used by the court - "The pendency of the indictment may
subject him (the accused) to public scorn and deprive him of emp-
loyment, and almost certainly will force curtailment of his speech,
associations and participation in unpopular causes. 5 The resulting
"anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation" was persua-
sive reason to hold that the petitioner had been denied his constitu-
tional right.
6
The procedure adopted in many American jurisdictions in deal-
ing with stays closely approximates the Canadian approach to a
withdrawal of charges. Concurrence is required between the pro-
secutor and the judge on the recommendation that a stay be entered.
Also, written reasons must be filed with the court. 7 The principle of
judicial check on the executive intrinsically involved in this structure
is a strong one, which focuses directly on correction of possible
arbitrariness or illegality 8 and, since it is in the nature of things that a
judge cannot delegate his authority, it is easy to determine responsi-
bility if abuses are alleged.9 To sanction the use of an arbitrary, i.e.
Part III
1. Letter from B.C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. to Connie Sun, 23 Oct. 1973.
2. Ibid.
3. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); 18 L.Ed. (2d) 1; 87 S.Ct. 988
(U.S.S.C.).
4. J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused -Pre Trial Rights (New York,
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1972) 523.
5. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 7.
6. Ibid.
7. C. Breitel, "Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement" (1960), 27 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 427, 433.
8. Davis, Discretionary Justice 142.
9. The question of where the discretion should lie, i.e. in the hands of the executive
or the judiciary, is analogous to the current debate taking place with regard to who
should provide the authorization to "wiretap". The basis of the choice is whether it is
more desirable to rely upon judicial independence or political responsibility for
protection of rights.
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unchecked, power by the prosecutor for the purpose of circumventing
judicial attitudes on withdrawals also facilitates manouvering by the
Crown to avoid other judicial attitudes. Requiring judicial approval
for stays as well as withdrawals is based on the logical proposition
that abuses are less likely if collaboration is a prerequisite.
The operation of our system of administration of criminal justice
is based on the principle that no one should be accused of a crime
unless his accusers are prepared and capable of making out in evi-
dence a prima facie case against him. If this cannot be done the
accused's remedy is in a tort action. It is, therefore, reasonable and
proper that the accused should have a determination of his guilt or
innocence duly made. The prosecution should not be able to easily
retreat and stay the proceedings except where the matter is of such
significance to public policy that the attorney general, personally, in
good conscience, cannot allow the prosecution to continue.
The protection for the individual is presumed to lie in due
process under our criminal adversary system, and in civil law re-
medies. The theory of the adversary system is that strong advocacy
on both sides of a question will result in the emergence of the truth.
Interjected into this system is the totally non-adversary procedure of a
stay of proceedings. The implications of such a power cannot be
overemphasized and the attorney general, as the one to make the
decision, presumably recognizes that when he stays proceedings the
accused is being deprived of his day in criminal court and has little
practical recourse in the civil courts. At the same time the impartial
judge of the proceedings is told that he cannot decide a case which
lower level judicial officers have legally determined should be
brought before the court for determination. The accused and or-
ganized society are unappealably denied the traditional benefits of the
adversary system without any public determination of whether the
proceedings are in fact terminated, or, if there has been a determina-
tion, whether i has been favourable to the accused. In such circums-
tances the authorities are clear that the accused cannot maintain an
action for malicious prosecution, the proof of which demands the
plantiff show that the proceedings have terminated in his favour.10
Alternative tort actions would be unduly delayed, if not com-
pletely frustrated by a stay, since the pendency of the indictment
effectively shields police and Justices of the Peace with, respectively,
10. See generally Scott, "Effect of 'Nolle Prosequi'."
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one year and six month limitation periods for civil suits for false arrest
and maliciously issuing criminal processes."
It is actually not surprising to find an increase in the use of stays
in Canada where legislatively unsanctioned inroads on the trial pro-
cess through pre-trial bargaining have developed. Empirical data has
been compiled which suggests that the North American experience is
one which more and more frequently circumvents the traditional
common law protections in favour of creating exchange situations,
outside normal court proceedings, which are anti-adversarial and
discourage participation in the trial process itself.
12
It may be that the prosecutor's intention to deal with charges
through alternative methods to the full trial procedure are socially
commendable and that experimental efforts in this direction might be
encouraged. '3 Nevertheless if, as a result of these efforts on the part
of prosecutors, tensions have developed between them and the
bench, it is highly improper to exploit the stay of proceedings as a
method of giving local prosecutors the upper hand. The following
statement by S. A. deSmith is notable for its relevance to the power to
stay proceedings. "It is not too much to say that in Britain the
independence of the Judiciary and the impartiality of the administra-
tion of criminal justice are maintained in spite of the strictly legal
powers vested in Parliament and the Executive. 14 ' To allow the
attorney general to sub-delegate the power to stay proceedings would
upset the balance within the system to such an extent that abuses
would become almost inevitable.
Alleged Abuses of the Power
It is outspokenly appreciated by some lower court judges in British
Columbia that stays are being abused in their courts. 15 His Honour,
Judge A. L. Bewley, formerly a Vancouver assistant prosecutor for
11. See Statute of Limitations, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 370, s. 11.
12. B. Grosman, "The Role of the Prosecutor: A Reappraisal" (1969), 7 Col. I. Dr.
Comp. 181.
13. Letter from Prof. K. Jobson, Federal Law Reform Commission to Connie Sun,
31 May 1973.
14. deSmith, Constitutional and Administrative law 173.
15. In informal interviews a number of B.C. Prov. Ct. judges indicated that they had
made repeated representations to various members of the executive concerning the
misuse of stays and that they were hopeful a political solution would be found. There
is clearly a strong reluctance on the part of the lower court judiciary to force an open
confrontation with the executive over this matter despite their concern.
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four years, and with over thirteen years experience on the provincial
court bench, makes the following comment:
It has been my painful experience to observe stays entered when
the 'right' person was charged with more than sufficient evi-
dence, and no witnesses missing or other (even vague) sugges-
tion of another such reason, with no reasons given (indeed,
some have been entered out of court).
It has fairly often been observed that prosecutors, faced with the
dismissal of the case, or the refusal by the court to grant the
prosecutor a further adjournment, enter stays to circumvent the
ruling or decision of the court; that done they have relaid the
same or similar charges on new informations.
It has been observed that a stay has been entered, on the day of
the trial, over the vehement objection of the accused who
wanted his day in court and a public acquittal, which, on the
facts of the case, he would in all probability have achieved.
It would be naive to believe that all stays have been entered
totally and only with the interests of justice to the alleged victim
or alleged offender, as the reason.
There may well be reasons why the Crown, through counsel, are
seeking to avoid embarrassment by reason of their error, or to
prevent a municipality from facing a suit for false arrest or
imprisonment. 16
Judge Bewley is not alone in his criticism of the use of stays in
Vancouver courts. His experienced colleague in the British Columbia
Provincial Court, His Honour Judge David Moffett, has also attacked
the practice "of indiscriminately entering stays of proceedings" as
"a violation of their intended use under section 508 of the Criminal
Code."
1 7
Some particular uses of stays in Vancouver courts have recently
been a source of conflict between prosecutors and judges. As indi-
cated by Mr. McMorran, and confirmed by Judge Bewley, pro-
secutors will enter stays when faced with an unfavourable ruling on a
motion for adjournment, then relay the charge in order to obtain
delays by that indirect method.1 8 Such action by the prosecutor was
challenged in R. v. Antonin Zetek1 9 heard in Vancouver on 9 De-
cember, 1971, before His Honour Judge J. L. Davies of the Provin-
cial Court.
The case involved a very minor shoplifting charge. Due largely
to the Crown's inefficiency there had been six court appearances
16. Letter From Judge A. L. Bewley to Connie Sun, 17 Oct. 1973.
17. Letter From Judge D. Moffett to Connie Sun, 17 Oct. 1973.
18. Appendix A, 1: Letter From Judge A. L. Bewley to Connie Sun, 17 Oct. 1973.
19. R. v. Antonin Zetek, Vancouver, B.C., 9 Dec. 1971, before Prov. Judge J. L.
Davies (unreported).
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extending over many months. On the seventh appearance the
prosecution's witness was unavailable due to illness. After submis-
sions by both counsel, the presiding judge refused the prosecutor's
request for a further adjournment. The prosecutor then directed the
clerk to enter a stay but the judge countered the order and proceeded
with the case. No evidence being called against the accused, the
charge was dismissed. From the transcript it appears that the judge
had two reasons for refusing to allow a stay to be entered: (1) The
abuse inherent in the use of a stay in the circumstances of that
particular case, i.e. to obtain an adjournment once the motion had
been refused, and, (2) the failure of the prosecutor to produce any
indication of authority from the attorney general. 20 Although this
lower court decision may be significant, it is not binding and has
apparently not been consistently followed by judges of that court. As
with the 1969 decision of His Honour, Judge D. M. McNeil, on the
illegality of stays in summary offence proceedings, the Crown appar-
ently decided against seeking a binding high court decision by appeal-
ing Judge Davies ruling. If Mr. McMorran's presumptions are cor-
rect, then Judge Davies was completely in error. One is tempted to
conclude that if Mr. McMorran had been confident of his legal
position he would not have hesitated to seek the ruling of a higher
court.
A somewhat different response was elicited from the bench
when the same tactic was attempted before His Honour, Judge N.
Mussallem by a prosecutor for the Federal Justice Department acting
on a charge under the Narcotics Control Act. After Judge Mussallem
had refused an adjournment the prosecutor stayed the charge. Mi-
nutes later the accused was brought back into the court and the
prosecutor relaid the charge. The judge's response was to order a 20
year remand - "I'll remand this man, of course. He is now on his
own recognizance on a $50 bond until November 30, 1991, when the
next appears in this court. 21 Judge Mussallem later denied the origi-
nal press reports which described him as being furious at the maneuv-
ering of the Crown. 22 Although the Justice Department originally
announced their intention to appeal the twenty year remand they later
entered a stay on the second charge without stating reasons for their
20. Ibid., Proceedings at Trial, 8-10.
21. "Judge Stumps Crown with 20-Year Remand", Vancouver Sun, 27 Nov.
1971, 1.
22. "Justice department hopes to reduce 20-year remand". Vancouver Sun, 21 Dec.
1971, 13.
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decision.23 It seems that the Federal Justice Department like provin-
cial Crown authorities, is also reluctant to risk a binding high court
judgment on the ways and means of using stays in British Columbia.
Dealing with current abuses
To deal with abuses of the power to stay proceedings in specific
factual situations it has always been assumed that one could find a
political resolution in an application of ministerial responsibility.
It is recognized as a part of the theory of ministerial responsibil-
ity that culpability is a matter of degree, i.e. some powers, although
within the statutory field of responsibility of the minister, are clearly
a matter of conduct within the department, in which case it is unlikely
that personal culpability could or should be implied. However, con-
vention has assigned certain powers and duties to the minister per-
sonally and among those is the "decision whether to enter a nolle
prosequi to stop a trial on indictment." 24 Clearly if the Canadian
statute permits wholesale delegation of discretion to stay proceedings
in a few provinces then it is permissable in all and the innovative
exploitations of stays may be properly copied in provinces that have
overlooked this convenient way to circumvent due process. Of course
an attorney general's political responsibility would be substantially
reduced since he could not be expected to know the circumstances of
each stay used.
The protection of ministerial accountability has worked well in
England where only one parliament both enacts and is concerned with
the administration of justice. However, the structural safeguard is
immensely weakened in Canada because of provincial autonomy
over federally enacted criminal law and procedure. While it is
theoretically possible that questions in a legislature about particular
cases might tend to moderate occasional prosecutorial excesses (if
they happen to be complained about), the effectiveness of such
political means is as variable as the comprehension, initiative, and
special interest of individual members of parliament and provincial
legislators. The present unrestrained practices with stays in British
Columbia and Manitoba have apparently evolved without significant
concern being expressed in Parliament or the respective legislatures.
Yet, with respect to British Columbia at least, it is evident that many
23. "Crown to appeal 20-year remand in pot case", Vancouver Sun, 30 Nov. 1971,
14; "Stay entered in 20-year remand case", Vancouver Sun, 1 Mar. 1972, 72.
24. deSmith, Constitutional and Administrative law 173.
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MLA's and MP's have long been fully aware of serious allegations of
abuses and that only since 1950 have ominously high incidences of
stays become a unique characteristic of that province.
25
An analysis of the very minimal reference to the use of stays
during House of Commons and Justice Committee debate on Bill C-2
is sufficient to demonstrate that it would be foolhardy to rely solely on
members of parliament to seek redress from responsible authorities or
to provide a check on discretionary power. Debate on the second
reading of the Bill included the following excerpt from a speech by
Robert McCleave (P.C.-Halifax-East Hants) -
I am told by critics outside the House that in British Columbia
the present method of stay of indictable proceedings has led to a
great number of prejudicial actions by the Crown, that it facili-
tates arbitrary arrests, jailing and fingerprinting or even sup-
pression of public disclosure and nothing ever comes out in
court . . . I indicate to the minister that he must be prepared to
defend this clause (extending power to summary conviction
matters) with all his resources when he comes to committee.
26
When the Bill did come up in committee Mr. McCleave was not
present.2 7 Andrew Brewin (NDP-Greenwood) raised the matter of
alleged abuse of the power in British Columbia. However, while he
clearly indicated that the power was a possible "instrument of abuse
or oppression", Mr. Brewin did not present a coherent attack on the
amendment and no other members in committee responded to or
queried the allegations of abuse. 28 On third reading there was no
debate on the provisions relating to stays. 29 Further, there is no
indication that either of these members followed up in Parliament the
accusations of abuse which they considered sufficiently important to
raise during the debate on Bill C-2.
It would be grossly unfair to single these particular members out
for criticism. There is ample confirmation that numerous members of
parliament, cabinet ministers, and senior civil servants have been
made aware of serious allegations concerning the use of stays. The
usual responses from both the lawyers and laymen among them vary
25. The problem was briefly raised in the B.C. legislature by Dr. G. Scott Wallace
(PC-Oak Bay). See "Proceedings stays overdone: Wallace" Vancouver Province,
26 Feb. 1972, 6. Also Judge D. Moffett claims to have made representations to the
B.C. Att'y. Gen's. Dept. See Letter from Judge D. Moffett to Connie Sun, 4 Oct,
1973.
26. Debates, House of Commons, (1972) Vol. II, 1701.
27. Letter from R. J. McCleave to Connie Sun, 30 Oct. 1973.
28. Proceedings, Justice and Legal Affairs Committee, 11-5-1972, 7:34-35.
29. Debates, House of Commons, (1972) Vol. III, 2357-2358.
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from a seeming incomprehension of the basic issues involved to
complete and utter indifference.
Traditionally, common law countries have relied heavily on a
vigilant press and conscientious legal profession, as well as the
accountability of the minister in parliament, to provide a check
against indiscriminate use of discretionary power. In England the
press provides a functional and effective curb on unwarranted use of
stays. The few incidences in recent years when stays have been used
were accompanied by comprehensive and discriminating comment in
the daily press.3 °The virtual inevitability of publicity undoubtedly
influences the attorney general in England to use the utmost circum-
spection when exercising the power to stay criminal proceedings.
At least in those areas of Canada which have suffered abuses of
the power to stay proceedings the press has been almost totally
ineffectual in fulfilling the "watch dog" role traditionally ascribed to
the fourth estate. There are numerous examples of newspaper reports
of cases where proceedings were stayed without any question being
raised as to why a stay was used, or in fact without indicating any
substantial degree of understanding as to how the disposition differed
from a withdrawal or dismissal.31 One can only conclude that in order
to provide a meaningful check on discretionary power the press
would have to be considerably more sophisticated in their approach to
observations on criminal proceedings.
The effectiveness of the press as a force countervailing abuse of
government power is inevitably geared to the political circumstances
prevailing in the community. Current standards of monopoly owner-
ship and political affiliation of the press in Canada leave little room
for confidence in its ability to seek out and expose abuses of executive
power in the administration of criminal justice. It is virtually incon-
ceivable that the phenomenal increase in stays in B.C. since 1950
could have been accomplished without at least tacit co-operation of
the regional press.
In a criticism of the use of stays in Vancouver His Honour,
Judge David Moffett comments:
I share the view that abuse of the power set out in Section 508 of
the Criminal Code in certain parts of Canada is in fact a weak-
30. [1958] Crim. L. Rev. 573, passim.
31. E.g., "3 years imposed in break-in case", Vancouver Sun, 28 Mar. 1972, 43;
"Heroin case dropped", Vancouver Sun, 14 Dec. 1972, 21; "Crown Enters Stay in
Shotgun Case", Vancouver Sun, 27 Nov. 1969, 89; "Stay entered", Vancouver
Province 6 Jan. 1973, 11.
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ness in our legal system which if not checked could lead to
serious and far reaching consequences. The fact that it has not
done so in most of Canada can be attributed to the high calibre
of the profession.3 2 (editor's emphasis)
It is characteristic of stays that their abuse in particular cases is not
easily discerned because clarifying facts are usually concealed from
the court, the public, and often from the accused. Only a few
prejudicially involved persons know whether the accused has been
wrongly denied an acquittal or unduly shielded from a conviction. To
a large extent the failure of the "officers of the court" in British
Columbia and Manitoba to inhibit the misuse of stays may be attri-
buted to lack of tradition, errors in training, proclivities for undue
administrative expediency, economic self-interest, and a low regard
for the integrity and independence of lower court judges, of whom
many are lay persons.
Basically, the primary victim of abuse of stays is the system of
justice itself, and there has been no spokesman who, comprehending
the long term effect of executive encroachment into the judicial
system, has been both willing and in a position to put pressure on the
legislative and administrative authorities to correct the misuse.
Clearly, the consistent enforcement of ministerial responsibility such
that it can be relied upon as the primary safeguard against abuse of the
discretionary power to stay proceedings, requires a diligence, under-
standing, and integrity on the part of legislators, bar, bench, and
press which cannot be assumed to exist in Canada.
Whereas political means are cumbersome and have apparently
failed to rectify the largely regional confusion in law with respect to
stays, there exists the possibility of judicial alternatives for bringing
reasonable consistency to this area of criminal law administration. It
is basic to Dicey's conception of the rule of law that - "the most
arbitrary powers of the English executive must always be exercised
under Act of Parliament (which) places the government, even when
armed with the widest authority, under the supervision, so to speak,
of the courts. 33
The issue of who can lawfully enter a stay of proceedings, i.e.
whether the power is delegable is, in the absence of legislative
clarification by statutory amendment, simply a matter for judicial
32. Letter From Judge D. Moffett to Connie Sun, 4 Oct. 1973. (Emphasis added).
33. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ( 10th ed.,
London, MacMillan & Co., 1959; reprint ed., New York, St. Martins Press,
1964) 413.
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interpretation of the current Criminal Code provisions. In the Van-
couver cases, where judges have challenged the entry of a stay,
because they were not satisfied that counsel had been "instructed"
by the attorney general, the Crown has apparently never appealed the
rulings. If the judiciary were consistent as to what they would
individually regard as satisfactory authorization for a stay, and re-
fused to allow stays to be entered where the statutorily required
"instruction" was not apparent, the Crown would be faced with
either seeking a higher court determination of the issue or conforming
to the interpretation of sections 508 and 732. 1 current to the majority
of jurisdictions in Canada.
34
The lower court judiciary is quite capable of initiative in this
matter. A compelling reason for them to do so is that the adversary
theory for finding the truth in our legal system has apparently broken
down on the subject of stays of proceedings. Defence counsel and
many of their clients obviously have as much, if not more, of a vested
interest in illicit stays than do crown prosecutors. Implicit in any
judicial proceeding is the presumption that the presiding judge knows
the law. There would appear to be ample law available to enable a
lower court judge to justifiably refuse entry of all stays that are not on
specific instructions from an attorney general35 , and all stays in
respect to indictable offences before an indictment is found.
36
Another more arduous, costly, and limited procedure for effect-
ing a binding judicial solution to part of the problem may lie in the
prerogative writs, although they are dependent on some wronged
victim lending himself to the cause and a counsel selling himself on
the idea of being embroiled in lengthy, non-profitable litigation
which might have to be pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada for
an authoritative determination. It is well established in administrative
law that if a power is granted for one purpose and exercised for a
different purpose then that power has not been validly exercised. 3 7 If
the discretionary power is conferred without reference to purpose, as
34. Alternatively prosecutors might lobby parliament for a statutory amendment
such as McMorran initiated with regard to stays in summary conviction matters.
35. R. v. Dunn (1843), 1 C&K 730; R. v. Antonin Zetek, supra, at n. 19; the
adherence to non-delegation practiced in most provinces contributes to the weight of
that interpretation.
36. R. v. Wylie, Howe, andMcGuire (1919), 83 J.P. 295;R. v. Edwards (1919), 31
C.C.C. 330(Alta. S.C.);R. v. Weiss (1915), 7 W.W.R. 1160,23 D.L.R. 710 (Sask.
S.C.).
37. S. A. deSmith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed., London,
Stevens, 1973) 319.
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in the case of the power to stay proceedings, it still must be exercised
in good faith and in accordance with such implied purposes as the
courts may attribute to the intention of the legislature. 38 In addition,
if the exercise of a discretionary power has been influenced by
considerations that cannot be lawfully taken into account, or by
disregarding relevant considerations, a court will hold that the power
has not been validly exercised. Again if the relevant factors are not
specified it is for the courts to determine whether the permissable
considerations are impliedly restricted and, if so, to what extent.
39
These principles were approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis.40 In the words of Rand, J.
There is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled 'discre-
tion', that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any
reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator; no
legislative act can, without express language, be taken to con-
template an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any pur-
pose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature
or purpose of the statute. 4 '
Rand, J. was, of course, referring to the scope of a licensing statute. It
is suggested, however, that his words have a general application to
the field of administrative law, including the administration of crimi-
nal justice, and in particular, can be applied to define and enforce the
terms on which ministerial discretion has been granted under sections
508 and 732.1.
Since the power to stay proceedings has been made part of
Canadian statute law it can no longer be viewed as an exercise of the
Crown's prerogative immune from judicial challenge. It is simply a
power Parliament has vested in the attorney general and should be
subject to the regulation which the courts have always imposed on
statutorily delegated power. The attorney general, therefore, would
be acting outside his statutory authority if he acted for an unau-
thorized purpose or took into account an extraneous consideration
(such as more administrative expediency), and historically the re-
medy has been to seek a prerogative writ.
38. Ibid., at 320.
39. Ibid., at 321; And seeShawn v. Robertson etal, [1964] 2 O.R. 696 (Ont. H.C.)
which dismissed a motion to strike out a staterhent of claim on the basis that it
disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Held, an executive or ministerial act may be
impeached by an allegation of bad faith or irrelevant considerations and the court can
call for an answer to such an allegation if aprimafacie case is made out.
40. Roncarelli v. Duplesis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 (S.C.C.).
41. Ibid., at 705.
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The British Columbia Supreme Court case of Re: O'Brien was
an instance where a writ of mandamus was sought against a magis-
trate who had allowed a stay to be entered at a preliminary hearing.
4 2
The magistrate was called upon to show why the accused should not
be either committed or properly discharged on the basis that there was
no power to stay at that stage since no indictment had been found. The
application was dismissed on the finding that the accused was effec-
tively discharged by the stay and it was therefore unnecessary to
consider the legality of the stay.
Also, on the initiative of an aggrieved accused, substantial
argument could be made for an application of the Bill of Rights when
a stay is entered on the basis that the "right" person has been
properly charged, but for various reasons the case cannot be made out
for the prosecution and there is no present intention to proceed at a
later date. The effect of the stay in such circumstances is to deliber-
ately deny the accused a prompt determination on the charge and may
be regarded as a contravention of section 2(f) of the Bill of Rights.
Lacking an express declaration of contrary intention sections 508 and
732.1 must be both "construed and applied" so as not to (f) deprive a
person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed
innocent until proven quilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing . . .43
A further possibility for seeking to control abuses of the attorney
general's power to stay proceedings lies in the inherent jurisdiction of
a court to prevent abuse of its processes and the onus on the individual
judge to preserve the integrity of his court. Substantial English
authority exists favoring the proposition advanced by Lord Devlin
that - "The courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transfer-
ence to the executive of responsibility for seeing that the process of
law is not abused.', 44 This approach has not fared well in Canadian
42. (1961-62), 36 W.W.R. 511 (B.C.S.C.); For a discussion of the availability of
mandamus against public officers to enforce statutory duties see 11 Halsbury's Laws
(3rd ed. 1955). 91-93. See also R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte
Blackburn, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763; 2 Q.B. 118; 2 W.L.R. 893 (C.A.); andR. v.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, exparte Blackburn and another (No. 3), [1973]
1 All E.R. 324 (C.A.).
43. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, s. 2(f); The cases in which s. 2(f) has been argued
are of little assistance in that presumption of innocence is most often the issue in
dispute. But seeRe Armstrong andState of Washington (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 331,
[1972] 3 O.R. 229 (Ont. H.C.) concerning right to a "public hearing".
44. Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C. 1254, 1354.
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courts. The leading case on the subject is R. v. Osborn45 where the
Supreme Court of Canada reversed a lower court ruling which dis-
missed proceedings because the court held that the prosecution was
oppressive to the accused. Basically, the Osborn case stands for the
position that the political arena must deal with all matters of con-
science. 4 6 It is suggested, however, that the Supreme Court in that
case failed to make a really determinative pronouncement and there is
still limited scope for the court to find that some uses of stays are an
abuse of process. However, unless a lower court summarily asserts
that a particular stay before it is inoperative for illegality it is certain
that neither it nor any appellate court can properly hear submissions
or evidence of alleged abuse of process in those proceedings unless
they are recommenced. If the stay is valid in law there is absolutely
nothing any court can do about it.
Recently, His Honour, Judge D. D. Jones, of the British Col-
umbia Provincial Court, found an abuse of process in the case of R. v.
McAnish and Cook4 7 when a prosecutor, who had stayed proceedings
after being refused an adjournment, later proceeded with an identical
charge upon a new information. In ordering the proceedings stayed
from the Bench, Judge Jones declared - "The prosecution must not
be permitted to render the exercise of judicial discretion completely
nugatory by entering a Stay of Proceedings, 'for the reason that the
court will not grant an adjournment'..."48 The learned Judge noted
further - "It is not too difficult to contemplate the evils where such a
procedure would be extended to manoeuvre any trial proceeding
before a Judge of choice." ,49 The judgment was not appealed by the
Crown but its effect is easily avoidable where local prosecutors
exercise the discretion by simply directing a stay rather than letting
the court rule on an adjournment.
The Terms of Use of the Power
The majority of the problems and abuses related to the use of stays
45. R. v. Osborn, (1969) 4 C.C.C. 185; 1 D.LR. (3d) 664 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd by,
(1971), C.C.C. (2d) 482; 15 D.L.R. (3d) 85; (1971) S.C.R. 184 (S.C.C.).
46. Haines, "Annot" (1970), 12 C.R.N.S. 11; But see R. v. Thorpe (1973), 11
C.C.C. (2d) 502 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R. v. K. (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 46; (1972), 1
W.W.R. 398sub nomR. v. Koski (B.C.S.C.);R. v. Gotfried (1964), 2 C.C.C. 382;
43 C.R. 307; 47 W.W.R. 282 sub nom Taylor v.Gotfried (Man C.A.).
47. R. v. McAnish and Cook, Vancouver, B.C., 5 Dec. 1973, before Prov. Judge
D.D. Jones (unreported).
48. Ibid., Proceedings at Trial, 2.
49. Ibid.
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could be adequately dealt with if the attorneys general personally
decided when particular proceedings should be stayed. That has been
the practice in most Canadian jurisdictions where there are no appar-
ent indications that abuse of the power has occurred. 50 This approach
is only feasible, however, if it is generally recognized that stays
should have a very limited application. If the categories of criteria in
which stays can be used are recognized as similar to those warranting
withdrawals then the nature of the power has been substantially
altered and arbitrary use of the power cannot be tolerated.
The primary quality of the power to stay proceedings is that it is
discretionary in nature. Discretion has been defined as - "an author-
ity conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations in
accordance with an officials' or an official agency's own considered
judgment and conscience. "51 Large measures of discretion charac-
terize the administration of criminal justice in North America, exist-
ing at the inception of a criminal matter and persisting until the end.
Discretion is exercised by the police, prosecutor, grand jury, and
judge in repeated instances. 52 There was early recognition by Dicey
that "wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness"
and, hence discretionary powers must only at "critical junctures" be
wielded by the executive. 5a Neither is it unusual for contemporary
commentators to be concerned with the fact that discretion involves
great hazard in that it makes easy the arbitrary, the discriminatory and
the oppressive. It has been said to offer "a fertile bed for corruption"
and "is conducive to a police state - or, at least, a police-minded
state". 54 Despite the apparent danger, however, it is generally rec-
ognized that discretion cannot be eliminated from the administration
of criminal justice except at intolerable cost, in that it functions to
provide the selectivity and individualization needed in criminal law
enforcement. The question then, is not how to eliminate discretion
but how to control it so as to avoid arbitrary, unjust, and oppressive
50. While there can be no assurance that the power has never been abused in those
provinces the description applied to the British use of the power appears relevant: it
would not, perhaps, be unfair to suppose that there has been no use of it amounting to
such an interference with due process of law as to call for the intervention of
Parliament. [1958] Crim. L. Rev. 573, 582.
51. R. Pound, "Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the
Individual Special Case" (1960), 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 925, 926.
52. See generally, A.F. Wilcox, The Decision to Prosecute (London, Butterworths,
1972).
53. Dicey, op. cit. at 188 and 413.
54. Breitel, op. cit. at 429.
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results. In short, the goal is to provide a framework within which
discretion can function in order to ensure that in seeking the benefits
of discretion the rule of law is not completely replaced by the rule of
men.
In his pioneering work in the field of discretionary justice K. C.
Davis noted that a startingly high proportion of all official discretio-
nary action pertaining to administration of justice is illegal or of
doubtful legality. 5 5 One solution would be to provide legislative
approval of the illegal official practices which have become part of
our legal system. 56 In fact that procedure was used with respect to
staying summary conviction proceedings. As to the use of stays
generally, however, a complete adoption of this approach is unac-
ceptable since legalizing all the practices which have become iden-
tified with the use of stays would involve too great an alteration to the
common law precepts, statutory protections and due process values
which characterize and justify our criminal justice system. Nonethe-
less, it is quite possible that certain practices which have been treated
in this paper as derogations from the law as presently constituted may
be sanctioned, either de jure by legislative amendment or defacto by
failure of Parliament, provincial legislatures, or the judiciary to
terminate their use. In that event the responsibility devolves to
individual administrators to ensure that the power is exercised with
the proper proportions of rule and discretion and a solution may lie in
adopting practical means current to administrative law for controlling
the discretion.
The central determination to be made with regards to the terms
of use of the power to stay proceedings is whether sub-delegation will
be sanctioned. In view of the foregoing, strict prohibition of sub-
delegation is to be preferred. If sub-delegation is to be tolerated, a
clear distinction must be drawn between responsible and irresponsi-
ble delegation. The current practice, in British Columbia at least,
would appear to fall into the latter category because it is delegation
without any attempt to provide central policy determination or, in
fact, any limitation on the subjective, ad hoc determinations of local
prosecutors. Clearly this form of delegation is unacceptable, not only
for the resulting lack of consistency, but also in its potential for
abuse. If the power to stay proceedings is going to be sub-delegated it
must be sufficiently structured to prevent utilization at the prosecutor-
55. Davis, op. cit., at 12.
56. Ibid.
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ial level inconsistent with the federal statute and published principles.
The purpose of structuring is to control the manner of the exercise of
the discretion within the boundaries which have been established for
the power.
5 7
There are many useful instruments which can be adapted to the
structuring of this particular discretionary power. The Vancouver
City Prosecutor's office, for example, makes admirable use of writ-
ten memoranda which authoritatively set out the purpose of the power
to stay proceedings as viewed by that department. 58 Guidelines in
this form should emanate from the provincial attorney general's
office to all prosecutors within the provincial jurisdiction. Similar
considerations apply to the policies to be adopted by the federal
attorney general and those should be the same throughout Canada.
The attorney general's office has or should have goals in mind
which they hope to achieve by the use of stays. In some form it must
state those goals in order not only that those charged with invoking
the power have a clear conception of what they are trying to accomp-
lish but also that an "outsider" can know what the policies and
principles are which govern the use of the power. 59 Policy statements
are only one very cautious step toward structuring the discretionary
power to stay proceedings. If they fail to produce a more consistent
application of the power then we should be prepared to look to the
formal and binding approach of federal enactments.
Part of the instructions by Mr. McMorran to his prosecutors
contains the following admonition - "It is quite unnecessary to
make public disclosure of the reasons for causing a stay to be entered;
indeed any comment may be highly inadvisable or even dangerous in
some circumstances. "60 If attorneys general are to maintain reasona-
ble control over the dispensation of this discretion when it has been
delegated, they should require prosecutors to promptly file reports as
to the facts and reasons for deciding to stay proceedings. In the
interests of an open system of justice, reasons should be read into the
court record. Mr. McMorran's hesitation to give reasons for his
decisions is the natural response of an administrator who, having a
discretionary power conferred upon him, hides behind the fact that
the law does not require him to formulate rules or follow precedents.
57. Ibid., at 97.
58. Appendices A and B.
59. Davis, op. cit., at 102.
60. Appendix B, 1.
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Without the creation of a record he can be assured that there can be no
check on the exercise of his discretion - Indeed, there can be no
check on whether the action was even a reasonable one. The exercise
of the power to stay proceedings will, therefore, remain completely
arbitrary.
The interaction of well-defined policy with the necessity of
stating reasons will tend to further develop identifiable guidelines as
to when a stay is the proper course of action. However, in recognizing
the place of discretion we, ipso facto, accept the limitations on
verbalized law. The guidance of discretion does not lend itself to a
rigid, particularized approach to precedent. The goal, therefore, is
not to promote a slavish adherence to binding precedent, i.e. not "to
maximize law and to minimize discretion", but "to maximize con-
sistency and to minimize inconsistency", and thereby foster credibil-
ity in the judicial process.
61
Surely when a stay is entered the prosecutor is working on the
basis of some notion as to why it is suitable in a given case. These
unarticulated principles as to when a stay should be entered must be
formalized, set out as rules, and opened to public scrutiny. While
discretion to depart from rules can be tolerated, discretion to violate
rules cannot. 62 Because some attorneys general have never had open
rules nor required open reasons, some prosecutors have had a free
rein to disguise favoritism and discrimination in their arbitrary use of
stays. To quote K. C. Davis - "Secret law, whether in the form of
precedents or in the form of rules, has no place in any decent system
of justice.' 6
3
The lack of use of precedents can be understood where a power
is newly constituted and there is a lack of experience in dealing with
it. However, for many decades the more mature jurisdictions have
adhered closely to the recognized precept that our legal system can
tolerate stays in only a few exceptional circumstances. The deroga-
tions from this system in western Canada have occurred despite
existing statutory limitations. At this point we can either reaffirm the
validity of long-standing precepts, or, if it is determined that illicit
use of stays occurred as a valid response to vital and unmet needs of
the criminal justice system as it operates in western Canada, expand
our categories to include those where it has been deliberatively
61. Davis, op. cit.,at 107.
62. Ibid., at 108.
63. Ibid., at 110.
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determined by Parliament to be necessary. In any event, it is incon-
ceivable that the administrators, i.e. prosecutors, can be heard to
argue that established precedents do not exist.
Conclusions
The historical origins of the stay of proceedings are found in the
common law nolle prosequi, a substantial prerogative power enabl-
ing the executive to suppress the judicial process. In England and
most of the provinces of Canada it is accepted law that this discretio-
nary power is vested exclusively in the person of the attorney general,
and that precedent and fundamental legal principles dictate very
restrictive use of the power only when duly considered circumstances
and public policy considerations confirm that a particular criminal
prosecution should not be judicially determined.
The power has long been statutory in Canada, where it suffers
from a lack of definitive judicial interpretation. In certain jurisdic-
tions it has been deemed capable of delegation as a general power to
local prosecutors to summarily manipulate the judicial process. Stays
have been used to circumvent judicial discretion with respect to
adjournments and applications to withdraw charges. The true reasons
for suppressing particular proceedings are virtually unascertainable
by the courts, or anyone outside the prosecution and the power is
therefore a peculiarly versatile instrument for subverting the purpose
and intent of criminal processes. Substantial allegations of abuse in
the Vancouver courts have been voiced by concerned members of the
judiciary. The divergent practices and grossly excessive use of the
power which have developed in British Columbia indicate that the
probabilities of abuse are considerable and lend weight to the accusa-
tions that have been made of corrupt use of stays.
Given the existence of this situation, substantial argument could
be made in favor of total abolition of the power. The historical
justifications for so empowering attorneys general have long since
become inoperative and the limited number of instances which can-
not be dealt with by a withdrawal of the charge or dismissal for want
of prosecution could presumably be the subject of specific statutory
provision.
However, assuming that this criminal law procedure is to be
preserved, steps must be taken to assure at least reasonable unifor-
mity in its use across Canada. It is submitted that tradition and present
statutory limits on the power to stay proceedings dictate that delega-
tion of the discretion cannot be tolerated. Support for this proposition
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is found by reference to fundamental principles and practical conse-
quences.
If the minister adhered to personal accountability for every stay
entered, as set out in the statute, ordinary political prudence and
demands on his time would tend to curb the number of stays used and
thereby forestall most of the objectionable practices that are attendant
to indulging local prosecutors with the discretion. While the present
arbitrary power might be justified if exercised solely by the politically
responsible chief law enforcement officer of the Crown, it cannot be
tolerated at a lower level. If it is generally appreciated as desirable
that the stay have a broader application than tradition and present
statutory limits prescribe, then the nature of the power must be
recognized and both administrative controls and procedural
safeguards imposed.
If politically responsible individuals fail to respond to the cur-
rent illicit use of stays it is imperative that a judicial solution be
sought.
Appendices
Memoranda to prosecutors obtained from A. Stewart McMor-
ran, former Chief Prosecutor, City of Vancouver.
A. 9 January 1968.
B. 2 February 1969.
MEMORANDUM TO PROSECUTORS
RE: Stays of Proceedings
I would advise Prosecutors that directing the Clerk to enter a
Stay is a serious step and a good rule to follow is to consult a
colleague or a more experienced Prosecutor before doing so, particu-
larly in serious matters or in cases where difficulties might arise. This
does not apply, of course, to those instances where a trial or hearing
on a similar subject matter has just been concluded, or where an
alternate charge has been laid, and it is necessary to deal with the
matter then and there.
As City Prosecutor of Vancouver I have the authority of the
Attorney-General, if needed, to enter Stays to Proceedings before,
during or after Court, on any charges in which I consider it proper to
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do so and I am authorized to delegate this authority to the Prosecutors
for whom I am responsible, and have done so.
A stay of Proceedings effectively concludes a charge against the
accused and there is clear authority in the various court decisions to
support this proposition. As a result no Court is in a position to deal
with the Information, or the charge, further, since there is nojurisdic-
tion left, there being no charge left in existence, only a concluded
Information. It is quite unnecessary to make public disclosure of the
reason for causing a Stay to be entered; indeed and comment may be
highly inadvisable or even dangerous, in some circumstances.
It is true, of course, that a charge can be re-laid after a Stay by
swearing a new Information, in the same way as if there had been a
dismissal without a hearing on the merits. In my opinion, however, it
is improper to cause a new Information to be sworn unless at the time
of re-charging there is evidence which was not available either in
Court or- otherwise at the time of the entering of the Stay. Even then,
care should be taken and a very close examination should be made of
the reasons why the evidence was not available originally. In every
instance when it is considered proper and desirable to re-lay an
Information after a Stay, this must have the specific approval of the
City Prosecutor.
A Stay of Proceedings is entered by having this action so marked
on the Information in order that the disposition of the case will appear
on the filed document.
If it is found necessary or desirable to enter a Stay of Proceed-
ings where the accused has pleaded or where there has been some
discussion involving the Magistrate or Judge, such as a preliminary
argument on the charge, etc., the action should be taken im-
mediately, since. an accused person is entitled to the benefit of the
disposition as soon as it is possible to give it to him and this becomes
doubly important where the accused is in custody. On the other hand,
however, in such cases, as a matter of common courtesy, the Court
must be advised of the action taken at the earliest opportunity, by
phone call if necessary, in order that the Judge or Magistrate will not
waste his time unnecessarily in considering any decision which might
have been required.
There is no problem in directing that a Stay be entered prior to
any Court appearance or in advance of the date to which the case may
have been adjourned. This has been the accepted practice for many
years in all the Courts, i.e., the Magistrates Courts and the criminal
side of both the Supreme and County Courts. It should also be kept in
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mind that once a case has been adjourned it may only be brought
forward to an earlier date at the instance of the accused.
Sometimes two or more charges are laid against an accused and
upon a plea of guilty to one, Stays are entered on the others. Make
sure that Stays are not entered in advance of the conviction and
sentence, but afterwards. There should be no Stays of Proceedings
entered on duplicate Informations. Often single charges are laid on
separate Informations at the beginning of an investigation, and prior
to trial are joined together in separate counts in the same Information.
If Stays are entered on the duplicates some difficulties may arise in
connection with identical charges upon which an accused may be
found guilty. In other words, if a Stay is entered on a duplicate
Information after a conviction, this may have the effect of nullifying
the conviction.
In entering Stays as well as in dealing with other duties and
responsibilities Prosecutors should keep in mind the maxim omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta, i.e., all things are presumed to have
been done rightly and in due form until the contrary is proven and
where acts are of an official nature or require the concurrence of
official persons, a presumption arises in favour of their due execu-
tion.
MEMORANDUM TO PROSECUTORS
RE: Withdrawals and Stays of Proceedings
In this regard see memoranda August 27, 1957, September 27,
1957, February 13, 1959 and August 12, 1964. (Copies filed with
this memo in Memo to Pros. file).
As I see it the difference between a withdrawal and a Stay of
Proceedings should be based on whether or not the accused was
properly charged. If he was not then the charge ought to be with-
drawn. But if he was and for some reason or other, such as the loss of
a witness or a breakdown in continuity of exhibits, etc., the case
cannot be made out on the evidence presently available, then a Stay of
Proceedings should be entered. The Stay takes the whole proceeding
out of the hands of the Court and it would seem advisable for a
Prosecutor not to allow himself to be placed in a position where a
Magistrate refuses to accede to a request for a withdrawal. If the
Prosecutor wants to have an end put to the matter he should enter his
Stay in the first place. In my view the responsibility. for not proceed-
ing with the case should rest with the Prosecutor, and the Magistrate
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should only be asked to permit a charge to be withdrawn where the
accused was not properly charged in the first place. (I think, perhaps,
there may be a different consideration where a complainant in a
common assault charge asks to be allowed to drop the charge). Since
the Prosecutor is in charge of the prosecution, and not the police, and
not the Magistrate, he should not avoid his responsibility on whether
or not to proceed, and leave the matter in the hands of the Magistrate
by having a plea taken and forcing him to make a conclusion, which
can only be a dismissal. Where no evidence is to be called, I do not
think the charge should be dismissed, (except in very special circums-
tances, when it should be at the request and instigation of the Pro-
secutor). Generally speaking if witnesses are not available and for
this or any other reason an adjournment cannot or should not be
obtained, or an adjournment is refused, the Prosecutor should control
the proceedings by entering a Stay, not allow the charge to be read
where the only result must be a dismissal. There should be no
dismissals for want of prosecution. This is a reflection, often unde-
served, on the administration of justice, in my opinion.
Although it is very, very rarely done, a charge can be relaid on a
new Information where a Stay has been entered. This should be done
only where at the time of the re-charging, evidence is in hand which
was not available at the time of the entering of the Stay.
Sometimes two or more charges are laid against an accused and
upon a plea of guilty to one, Stays are entered on the others. Make
sure that such Stays are not entered in advance of the conviction and
sentence but afterwards.
The above applies to all indicate offences because of the provi-
sions of Code Sec. 490 and seeR. v. O'Brien 36 C.R. 426 andR. v.
Leonardexparte Graham 133 C.C.C. 262. Although Code Sec. 490
does not apply to Part 24 and the Summary Convictions Act in Sec.
101 only applies Part 24, we have taken the position that if the
Attorney-General can stop a serious charge he must be entitled to stop
a minor one and accordingly have applied the "Stay of Proceedings"
policy to summary conviction cases under Part 24 of the Code and
under the Provincial Summary Convictions Act.
In the result the policy as set out above is to be followed and
applied on all our charges as the need arises.
